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Abstract
Channel modeling is crucial for studying the behavior of quantum channels in order to build an eﬃcient error
correction scheme in addition to security veriﬁcation of diﬀerent protocols. While most current analyses
of quantum protocols use a traditional mathematical approach, we employ a simpler probabilistic model
checking which is more compatible with classical implementations to investigate the dependency of the
security on the quantum channel noise. We also compare a couple of eavesdropping strategies from the
security point of view.
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1 Introduction
The ﬁeld of quantum information theory has brought the potential to accomplish
feats considered impossible by purely classical methods. One of these is the ability
to transmit an unconditionally secure message between two parties, known as quan-
tum cryptography. Quantum cryptography is one of the earliest practical results
among the various theories which are tied with quantum mechanics and are not yet
fulﬁlled by present technologies.
On the one hand, quantum mechanics postulates put some constraints on all
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logic that governs classical communication. On the other hand, those postulates
enhance security beyond computational security. It should be noted that the quan-
tum channel and quantum bits are utilized for transmitting classical bits of the key.
The complete communication either involves a classical medium in parallel or the
classical data can be sent through the same quantum channel [1].
Quantum key distribution (QKD) establishes a string of random bits shared by
two spatially separated parties, say Alice and Bob, in an information-theoretically
secure manner [2]. Later, Bob performs a sifting transaction or secret key reconcil-
iation (through the public channel) to discard all cases where he reads the wrong
basis.
The BB84 and B92 protocols are among the ﬁrst and best-known ones which
are proved to be unconditionally secure even with some assumptions of imperfec-
tions in the channel and devices [3, 4]. There have been several recent methods,
some of which are based on teleportation and entanglement, such as the six-state
scheme, which have relatively enhanced the security bound and tolerate more er-
rors [12]. There have been numerous theoretical investigations done by computer
scientists on channel modeling in QKD protocols, most of which concentrate on the
ideal conditions; in the worst case, they model the channel noise equivalent to the
eavesdropper (Eve)’s eﬀect. To have a more realistic description of the channel for
a particular protocol, one has to consider diﬀerent tapping schemes, the detection
eﬃciency of measurement devices [9, 10] and statistical parameters of channel im-
perfections such as noise, damping factor (for dissipating channels), decoherence [7],
etc.
In this paper, we have measured the security of the BB84 protocol using a
probabilistic modeling approach and built a simple model for channel noise and
imperfections which have been veriﬁed by PRISM programming. The results are
shown to tend to those of the noiseless channel cases and the comparison of diﬀer-
ent tapping scenarios is consistent with the other works [13]. The rest of the paper
is organized as follows: The model of quantum channels is described in section 2.
The PRISM model checker, simulation details and experimental results are given in
section 3. The paper is concluded in section 4.
2 Building the Model
Model checking is a procedure involving three main steps: (i) constructing an ab-
stract model of a given system (system speciﬁcation); (ii) deﬁning the properties
desired of the system in a form that can be checked automatically (property speci-
ﬁcation); and (iii) feeding the model into an appropriate software tool (veriﬁcation,
which will be covered in the next section). A model checker then employs its built-in
algorithms to simulate the possibilities and give the result in the form of probabili-
ties [8].
Probabilistic simulations are based on diﬀerent probabilistic models like CTMC,
MDP, DTMC, etc. In our experiment, the Discrete Time Markov Chain (DTMC)
model is used for security veriﬁcation of BB84 in a noisy channel. We concentrate
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on Intercept-Resend attacks as eavesdropper’s strategy, but a security comparison
with Random Substitution attacks is also investigated [8].
In the following subsections, we ﬁrst brieﬂy introduce the basic concepts of
DTMC which are useful for better understanding of the model-checking procedure.
Then, we present a simple form of channel noise applied in protocol analysis.
2.1 Discrete Time Markov Chains
A Markov chain is a stochastic process whose state space I is discrete (ﬁnite or
countably inﬁnite) and such that the probability distributions for its future devel-
opment depend only on the present state and not on the path (consisting of past
states) that was followed to reach this state. If we further assume that the param-
eter space T is also discrete, then we have a discrete time Markov chain. We can
state the Markov property as
P (Xn = in|X0 = i0,X1 = i1, ...,Xn−1 = in−1) = P (Xn = in|Xn−1 = in−1) (1)
where the Xi’s are random variables at time step i = {0, 1, 2, ...} and if Xn = j,
then the state of the system at time step n is j, X0 being the initial state of the
system. So the transition probability of the Markov Chain is given by
pjk(m,n) = P (Xn = k|Xm = j), 0 ≤ m ≤ n (2)
and if its value depends only on the diﬀerence n−m, i.e., the number of steps, then
such chains are called homogeneous Markov chains. In such a case:
pjk(n) = P (Xm+n = k|Xm = j) (3)
denotes the n-step transition probabilities. The one step transition probabilities of
a DTMC could be speciﬁed in the form of a transition probability matrix. The row
sums of this square matrix are equal to unity. It plays an important role in the
analysis based on DTMC. The n-step transition probabilities can be computed by
one form of the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation:
pij(m+n) =
∑
k
pik(m)pkj(n) (4)
Let P (n) be the n-step transition probability matrix, then we can write the above
equation as:
P (n) = P.P (n− 1) = Pn (5)
Hence, the one step transition probability matrix could be multiplied (n− 1) times
by itself to get the n-step transition probability matrix. Also using the theorem of
total probability we have:
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pj(n) = P (Xn = j) =
∑
i
pi(0)pij(n) (6)
Hence, the step-dependent probability vector of, denoting by p(n) of Xn at time n
could be expressed as
p(n) = [p0(n), p1(n), ..., pj(n), ...] = p(0)P
n (7)
2.2 Quantum Channel Noise Modeling
There are various noise forms which can be described as a stochastic process by
giving the power density, probability distribution, etc. We here consider a simple
model which is expressed with a single parameter, say PN , which represents the
probability of ﬂipping the transmitted qubit in its own basis. The protocol security
is expected to diminish as the entropy of the received qubit increases which corre-
sponds to greater values of PN up to
1
2 . We can deﬁne this parameter for every part
of the channel. In our discussion, the channel has two sections. We assume that
all imperfections in the transmitting device of Alice, the quantum channel between
Alice and Eve and the receiver device of Eve can be modeled by PN1 and the imper-
fections in Eve’s transmitter, the channel between Eve and Bob and Bob’s receiver
are modeled by PN2.
Although the existence of noise is a desirable fact for the eavesdropper, passive
attacks are still unattainable. In other words, Eve cannot hide her modiﬁcations
completely in the channel noise and her presence is detectable, but with a relatively
lower chance. It should be noted that Eve is assumed to have ultimate computa-
tional power and unlimited technology for state preparation.
The detection probability of Eve is our model criterion for security [11] which
is denoted by Pdet. This probability is only well-deﬁned when the selected bases by
both Alice and Bob are the same, so they are able to check if there is any evidence
of tapping. Therefore, we focus on the two cases when the transmitted qubit by
Alice and received qubit by Bob are either equal or non-equal, where P (A = B)
and P (A = B) are the probabilities of each of the mentioned cases and the bases
are supposed to be identical. Then, we have:
Pdet = Pdet|(A = B).P (A = B) + Pdet|(A = B).P (A = B) (8)
In a noiseless channel, P (A = B) = 1− P (A = B) = 34 ; For nonzero values of PN1
and PN2, this statement is, however, no longer correct. Also, let
P0(N) = [1− exp(−0.134N)]/N (9)
where P0(N) represents the probability of detection of Eve per qubit in a noiseless
channel for an intercept-resend attack [13]. It can be shown that the detection
probabilities can be derived as follows:
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Pdet|(A = B) =
P0[PN1(1− PN2) + PN2(1− PN1)]
P0[PN1(1− PN2) + PN2(1− PN1)] + (1− P0)[(1− PN1)(1− PN2) + PN1PN2]
(10)
and
Pdet|(A = B) =
P0[(1− PN1)(1− PN2) + PN1PN2]
P0[(1− PN1)(1− PN2) + PN1PN2] + (1− P0)[PN1(1− PN2) + PN2(1− PN1)]
It may sound reasonable to think of identical stochastic characteristics in the two
mentioned parts of the channel for simpliﬁcation which means PN1 = PN2 = PN .
Then, if we deﬁne:
H = 2PN (1−PN )
which is proportional to the variance of a Bernoulli random variable, peaked at
PN =
1
2 . The above formula can be reduced to:
Pdet|(A = B) =
P0H
(1− P0)(1 −H) + P0H
Pdet|(A = B) =
P0(1−H)
P0(1−H) + (1− P0)H
3 Applying the model in PRISM
3.1 Simulation Details
Because of the random behavior of quantum phenomena, it has been suggested to
use an appropriate probabilistic tool for verifying quantum protocols instead of log-
ical model-checkers like SPIN [6, 14]. Among them, PRISM (probabilistic symbolic
model-checker) has some advantages especially for BB84 analysis as the protocol
developers also used it for this purpose [7]. Papanikolaou proposed an analysis of
BB84 for two possible attacks where the channel is considered noiseless and all the
device imperfections are neglected [14].
Here, each DTMC state corresponds to a unique event which is possible accord-
ing to the protocol ﬂowchart and the transition probabilities are determined by our
assumptions. For example, it is logical to consider a 50-50 chance for both Bob and
Eve to get the correct qubit providing that their measurement basis is not the same
as that of the received qubit.
In transmission of a stream of qubits, the security criterion and simulation time
(14)
(13)
(12)
(11)
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highly depend on the size of the stream or number of transmitted qubits, say N .
Larger numbers of qubits provide more security but need more complex systems to
be implemented.
3.2 Experimental Results
The following 3 ﬁgures show the security criterion for an intercept-resend attack in
a noisy channel. They are plotted by exporting the result into MATLAB software.
In ﬁgure 1, the role of channel noise is illustrated which reduces the curvature of
the graph when it goes up. Thus, Eve is more likely to be detected. Note that the
noiseless condition is shown at the top of other graphs.
Fig. 1. Security criterion vs. PN1 for N = 50 for diﬀerent values of PN2.
Figure 2 depicts the best and worst cases with respect to the presence of noise in
the second part of the channel, i.e., between Eve and Bob.
Fig.2. Security vs. PN1 for three pairs of graphs
when the second part of the channel is either noiseless or random.
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In the next ﬁgure we suppose identical statistical conditions for both parts of the
channel which means PN1 = PN2 = PN . It shows the security dependency on the
number of transmitted qubits (N) as it was expected.
Fig. 3. Security vs. PN for diﬀerent values of N
Figure 4 is inserted directly from the PRISM environment and shows that it is not
a clever idea for Eve to choose random substitution as the detection probability
would be considerably higher. That is why it is preferred not to repeat the previous
analysis for random substitution attack [5].
Fig. 4. Security criterion vs. noise probabilities for diﬀerent numbers of qubit stream lengths (10 and 60)
for the two attacks. Note that when the channel behavior is completely random, the security has its
minimum value and the corresponding values for both attacks become equal. Again, we have
PN1 = PN2 = PN (which is denoted by np in here [5]).
4 Conclusion and Future Directions
In this presentation, we employ PRISM for analyzing BB84 with diﬀerent tapping
scenarios which are also focused on in [14]. The outcomes for noiseless and noisy
channel are compared and it is shown that it conﬁrms and satisﬁes the expected
results and formula [13]. Further investigations can be done by building a more
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complicated model of the noise or considering other imperfection factors. Also, the
same veriﬁcation can be done for other protocols or security criteria.
References
[1] Mitra, A., Complete Quantum Communication with Security, (1995), URL:
http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9812087v7.
[2] Dobsi ek, M., J. Kola, and R. Lorencz, A Theoretic-framework for Quantum Steganography, Proc. of
CTU Workshop (2006), 124–125.
[3] Hupkes, H. J., Unconditional Security of Practical Quantum Key Distribution, URL:
arXiv:quant-ph/0402170v1 .
[4] Tamaki, K. et al., Unconditional Security of the Bennett 1992 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol
over a Lossy and Noisy Channel, Physical Review A (2004).
[5] Tavala, Amir M., Soroosh Nazem, and Ali A. Babaei-Brojeny, Security Veriﬁcation of BB84 Protocol
Using PRISM Model-Checker, Proc. of International Iran Conference on Quantum Information (2007).
[6] Gay, S., R. Nagarajan, and N. Papanikolaou, Probabilistic Model-Checking of Quantum Protocols, URL:
arXiv: quant-ph/0504007v2 (2005).
[7] Barenco, A., T. A. Brun, R. Schack, and T. P. Spiller, Eﬀects of noise on quantum error correction
algorithms, URL: arXiv:quant-ph/9612047v1 (1996).
[8] Wu, L., and D. A. Lidar Overcoming quantum noise in optical ﬁbers, Physical Review A (2004).
[9] Gottesman, D., Lo, H. K., Lutkenhaus, N., and Preskill, J. Security of quantum key distribution with
imperfect devices, Proc. of International Symposium on Information Theory (2004).
[10] Guerreau, O. L., F. J. Malassenet, S. W. McLaughlin, and J. M. Merolla, Quantum Key Distribution
without a Single-Photon Source Using a Strong Reference, IEEE Photonics Technology Letters 178
(2005).
[11] Mayer, D., Unconditional Security in Quantum Cryptography, Journal of ACM483 (2001).
[12] Gottesman, D., and H. K. Lo, Proof of Security of Quantum Key Distribution With Two-Way Classical
Communications, IEEE Trans. Information Theory 492 (2003).
[13] Nagarajan, R., N. Papanikolaou, G. Bowen, and S. Gay An Automated Analysis of the Security of
Quantum Key Distribution, URL: arXiv:cs.CR/0502048 v1 (2005).
[14] Papanikolaou, N., Techniques for design and validation of quantum protocols, M.Sc. Thesis, URL:
http://www.dcs.warwick.ac.uk/ nikos/.
A.M. Tavala et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 270 (1) (2011) 175–182182
